上海，它已經(jīng)自豪的宣稱14條地下線，一條高速的磁懸浮列車服務(wù)，2個巨大的現(xiàn)代機場，大約20條高速公路和每三分鐘就一次的子彈鐵路的啟程處，將添加超過一件的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施---新的金磚四國的發(fā)展銀行的總部。中國正在和大的正在出現(xiàn)的市場（巴西，俄羅斯，印度以及南非)的其他四個成員一起建立一個銀行。
       適當(dāng)?shù)氖牵y行將聚焦于借給更窮的國家的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施。中國也致力于建立其他的多邊借主，亞洲的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資銀行，它，正如名字所暗示的那樣，將會聚焦在相同的事情上。擁有了這兩個新的銀行，中國正在出口中心特征的發(fā)展模型運送到世界的其他地方。根據(jù)
麥肯錫全球機構(gòu)，中國正在花費自身的8.5%的自身的GDP投資于基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施。這意味著多于任何的其他國家，并且遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過發(fā)展中國家的2-4%的GDP的發(fā)展中國家。
       考慮到中國的增長---在那段時間它的經(jīng)濟已經(jīng)擴張了七倍---投資在基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的智慧看起來似乎是不言而喻的。研究大體上總結(jié)在基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資和增長之間的積極關(guān)系，特別是在更窮的國家。根據(jù)世界銀行給的文化方面的一個寬泛調(diào)查，使得拉丁美洲的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施和東亞的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施一樣好，在一些國家有最壞的道路和電話，能夠增長每年5%的增長率。
       但是孤立任何給定的事物的增長率的精確的影響是困難的。投資通常給予GDP以直接的提升，是否它包括通往任何地方的一座橋，或者是到達(dá)擁擠的島嶼的一座橋。更重要的是長期的影響力。隨著時間的過去，基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施能夠從兩個主要方面激起成長。如果降低的交易費用能夠提高貿(mào)易它就能夠帶來收入的增長。并且基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施能夠?qū)е赂蟮男畔⒎窒砗鸵虼颂岣呱a(chǎn)率，它就能提高生產(chǎn)率。但是這些影響很難衡量，因為基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資和經(jīng)濟增長通常一致，引起對因果律的懷疑。請問新的道路促進(jìn)了增長，亦或者是更快的增長提高了對他們的需求。
      中國提供了一個理想的實驗場地。不僅政府投入巨大資金用于建設(shè)，政府還把錢用在需求還不總是很明顯的地方。使得經(jīng)濟學(xué)家更容易孤立作為一個獨立變量的投資的影響力。越來越多的研究正在觀看基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施狂歡的影響力。
      在最近的工作文件中，清華大學(xué)的王洋和吳斌鎮(zhèn)觀看了高海拔的鐵路，它連接了青海到西藏的領(lǐng)域。他們宣稱，要盡可能的接近自然實驗。這個區(qū)域是中國最窮的區(qū)域之一，意味著最初的增長并不能推進(jìn)投資。這個路線由它的技術(shù)可能性決定，而不是當(dāng)?shù)氐慕?jīng)濟。使他更類似于一個隨機的審判。他們發(fā)現(xiàn)，這個影響力是巨大的。和那些沒有鐵路的郡相比那些有鐵路的郡每人的GDP有33%的增長。它等同于每年有額外GDP120億，超過了剛開始三年的330億。這個收入增長的主要渠道是當(dāng)?shù)氐纳a(chǎn)商賣給國家市場的新發(fā)現(xiàn)的能力。
       SHANGHAI, which already boasts 14 subway lines, a high-speed maglev service, two huge modern airports, some 20 expressways and a bullet-train departure every three minutes, is about to add one more piece of infrastructure—the headquarters of the new BRICS development bank. China is setting up the bank together with the four other members of the BRICS club of big emerging markets: Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa.

Fittingly, the bank will focus on infrastructure lending to poorer countries. China is also pushing to establish another multilateral lender, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which, as its name suggests, will concentrate on the same thing. With these two new banks, China is exporting a central feature of its development model to the rest of the world. It spent 8.5% of its GDP investing in infrastructure from 1992 to 2011, according to the McKinsey Global Institute. That was more than any other country, and well above the developing-country norm of 2-4% of GDP.

Given China’s growth—its economy expanded seven-fold during that time—the wisdom of investing in infrastructure seems self-evident. Research generally turns up a positive relationship between infrastructure investment and growth, especially in poorer countries. According to one broad survey of the literature by the World Bank, making Latin America’s infrastructure as good as East Asia’s would increase annual growth rates by as much as five percentage points in the countries with the worst roads and phones.

Yet it is difficult to isolate the precise effect on growth of any given project. Investment normally gives an immediate lift to GDP, whether it involves a bridge to nowher or one to a crowded island. What matters is the long-run impact. Over time, infrastructure can gin up growth in two main ways. It can generate a rise in incomes if reduced transaction costs promote trade. And it can raise growth rates if it leads to greater information sharing and thus improved productivity. But these effects are hard to measure because infrastructure investment often coincides with economic growth, casting doubt on causality. Did the new roads boost growth or did faster growth increase demand for them?

China provides an ideal testing ground. Not only has the government thrown vast sums into construction, it has also directed the money at places wher demand is not always apparent, making it easier for economists to isolate the effects of the investment as an independent variable. A growing body of research looks at the impact of China’s infrastructure binge.

In a recent working paper, Yang Wang and Binzhen Wu of Tsinghua University look at the high-altitude railway connecting the province of Qinghai to Tibet. It is, they argue, as close to a natural experiment as possible. The region was one of China’s poorest, meaning that prior growth did not prompt the investment. The route was determined by its technical feasibility, not the economy of the local area, making it akin to a randomised trial. The impact, they find, was vast: a 33% increase in GDP per person in counties that got the railway compared with those that did not. That equates to about 12 billion yuan ($1.9 billion) extra GDP a year, exceeding its 33 billion yuan cost in just three years. The main channel for this rise in income was the new-found ability of local manufacturers to sell to a national market.