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中國為何支持新能源汽車
中國汽車業高管通常不會在例行的行業簡報中暗示南中國海爆發戰爭的可能性。然而，比亞迪(BYD)董事長王傳福上月在推出該公司最新款電動汽車時就這么做了，這款汽車是該公司與德國戴姆勒(Daimler)聯手組建的合資公司開發的。
在被問到他為何對全球最大汽車市場的電動汽車前景感到樂觀時，王傳福提出，政府政策支持將是一個關鍵的成功因素，這在一定程度上受到中國對于“兩個60%”擔憂的推動。
中國現在每年的石油需求有60%左右依靠進口，其中60%通過南中國海運輸，在南中國海，未經沙場的解放軍海軍正試圖投射實力，逼退菲律賓、越南和美國等對手。
“南中國海是一個非常復雜的問題，”王傳福表示，他指的是該地區可能引發沖突并破壞海上交通的領土爭端。“如果船舶無法運送石油，那么中國將面臨嚴重的石油短缺。”
今年夏季，中國政府推出新的、補貼力度加大的激勵舉措，以促進“新能源汽車”的開發，其中還有其他原因，最突出的是污染。但王傳福辯稱，地緣政治擔憂是出臺面向替代能源汽車的政策支持的最大因素。
他表示：“石油安全是推動新能源汽車發展的最重要因素，”他補充稱，李克強總理今年3月宣布“向污染宣戰”是“第二個推動因素”。
王傳福擅長推銷，顯然，他強調可能推升比亞迪股價的因素對自己是有好處的，特別是在今年該公司汽油動力汽車銷量大幅下滑的情況下。但他的分析是值得關注的。政界人脈遠遠強于跨國車企外籍高管的中國汽車業高管，很少在公開場合分享他們對于中國政府動機以及較長期目標的洞見。
比亞迪董事長的政治敏感也要好于多數人。
除了在一個政府主導的行業成為一個成功的民營企業家（比亞迪最初是一家手機電池制造商，后來進軍汽車業）以外，王傳福還有一些不尋常的合作伙伴。
他的最大投資者之一是李祿，李祿曾在1989年天安門廣場學生抗議活動中擔任學生領袖。在抗議遭到流血鎮壓后，李祿逃往美國，最終成為一名億萬富翁基金經理。這位前民主活動人士早早發現了比亞迪的潛力，并把王傳福介紹給他的偶像沃倫•巴菲特(Warren Buffett)，巴菲特控股的中美能源(MidAmerican Energy Holdings)現在是比亞迪最大單一股東。
中國對新能源汽車的需求一直不旺，主要是因為潛在車主對充電站的覆蓋率感到擔憂。中國的新能源汽車保有量只有7萬輛左右，其中多數為公交車或出租車。這表明，中國政府制定的到明年銷售50萬輛以及到2020年銷售500萬輛新能源汽車的目標將很難實現。
然而，王傳福表示，政府決心實現目標，不僅因為如果通往中東油田的海上運輸線被切斷，中國希望擁有一支可以繼續運轉的車隊。他表示，中國政府擔心，盡管本土汽車行業可能為全球規模最大，但并非全球實力最強。外國品牌主宰著中國市場。
王傳福表示，新能源汽車將給中國國內汽車廠商提供另一條奪取行業主導地位的途徑。這并非他一人的觀點。
最近，中國歐盟商會(EU Chamber of Commerce in China)表示擔心，針對新能源汽車的政府補貼和激勵舉措只適用于那些“在中國生產的中國品牌”汽車。這意味著，核心技術必須向中國當局披露。
中國歐盟商會汽車工作組在一份意見書中表示：“一方面，（新能源汽車）旨在緩解中國對進口石油的依賴，另一方面，（政府政策）是自主電動車產業發展的一份藍圖，有朝一日可能會取代跨國（汽車制造商）的主導地位。”
意見書提出，中國政府的戰略愿景忽視了一個事實：“汽車行業長期全球化……這有利于所有經濟參與者以及消費者。”
如果中國對21世紀能源安全的追求被陳舊的保護主義本能的削弱，那將是具有諷刺意味的。
China’s global woes spark hope for electric car sector
Chinese auto executives do not usually allude to the possibility of a shooting war in the South China Sea in the course of otherwise routine industry briefings. Yet Wang Chuanfu, chairman of BYD, did just that last month during the launch of the company’s latest electric car, developed by its joint venture with Daimler of Germany.
Asked why he was optimistic about electric vehicles in the world’s largest automotive market, Mr Wang argued that government policy support would be a critical factor in success, driven in large part by Beijing’s concerns about “the two 60 per cents”.
China now imports about 60 per cent of its annual oil requirement and 60 per cent of those imports are shipped through the South China Sea, a region wher the untested People’s Liberation Army Navy is trying to project power and push back its Philippine, Vietnamese and US rivals.
“The South China Sea is a very complicated problem,” Mr Wang said, referring to the region’s territorial disputes that could potentially spark a conflict and disrupt maritime traffic. “If ships could not deliver their oil China would face severe shortages.”
There are other reasons the Chinese government this summer issued new and improved incentives to spur development of so-called NEVs, or new energy vehicles, most notably pollution. But Mr Wang argued that geopolitical concerns loomed largest in its formulation of policy support for alternative energy vehicles.
“Oil security is the biggest driver for NEV development,” he said, adding that Premier Li Keqiang’s “war on pollution”, declared in March this year, was “the second driver”.
Mr Wang is a good salesman and clearly has an interest in highlighting forces that may drive up BYD’s share price, especially given a collapse in sales of its gasoline-fuelled cars this year. But his analysis is worth paying attention to. Chinese auto executives, who are far better connected than their expatriate counterparts at multinational car companies, rarely share their insights on Beijing’s motivations and longer-term objectives in public settings.
BYD’s chairman also has better tuned political antennas than most.
In addition to succeeding as a private entrepreneur in a state-dominated industry – BYD began as a manufacturer of mobile phone batteries before diversifying into cars – Mr Wang also has rather unusual partners.
One of his largest investors is Li Lu, a student leader during the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests. After those ended in bloodshed, Mr Li fled to the US and ended up a billionaire fund manager. The former democracy activist spotted BYD’s potential early and introduced Mr Wang to his idol, Warren Buffett, whose MidAmerican Energy Holdings is now the biggest single shareholder in the company.
Chinese demand for NEVs has been tepid, largely because of drivers’ concerns about the availability of an adequate charging infrastructure. There are only about 70,000 NEVs in use in China, most of them public buses or taxis. That suggests the government’s target of 500,000 NEV sales next year and 5m by 2020 will be difficult to reach.
But Mr Wang said the government was determined to succeed – and not just because it wants a vehicle fleet that can keep running even if maritime lifelines to Middle East oilfields were to be cut off. Beijing, he said, is concerned that while its auto industry may be the world’s largest, it is not the strongest. Foreign brands dominate the market.
According to BYD’s chairman, NEVs offer China’s domestic auto companies an alternative route to industry dominance. He is not alone in this view.
Yesterday, the EU Chamber of Commerce in China expressed concern that government subsidies and incentives for NEVs only apply to those “produced in China under a Chinese brand”. That means underlying technologies have to be disclosed to local authorities.
“While at one level [NEVs] are meant to alleviate China’s dependency on imported oil, on another, [government policy] is a blueprint for the development of an indigenous electric vehicle industry that might one day trump the dominant position of multinational [car companies],” the chamber’s automotive working group said in a position paper.
It argued that Beijing’s strategic vision ignores the fact that “the automotive industry has long been highly globalised . . . in ways that benefit all economic players as well as consumers”.
It would ironic if China’s 21st century quest for energy security was undermined by old-fashioned protectionist instincts.
Tom Mitchell is the Financial Times’ Beijing correspondent
（更多資訊請關注中國進出口網）
Asked why he was optimistic about electric vehicles in the world’s largest automotive market, Mr Wang argued that government policy support would be a critical factor in success, driven in large part by Beijing’s concerns about “the two 60 per cents”.
China now imports about 60 per cent of its annual oil requirement and 60 per cent of those imports are shipped through the South China Sea, a region wher the untested People’s Liberation Army Navy is trying to project power and push back its Philippine, Vietnamese and US rivals.
“The South China Sea is a very complicated problem,” Mr Wang said, referring to the region’s territorial disputes that could potentially spark a conflict and disrupt maritime traffic. “If ships could not deliver their oil China would face severe shortages.”
There are other reasons the Chinese government this summer issued new and improved incentives to spur development of so-called NEVs, or new energy vehicles, most notably pollution. But Mr Wang argued that geopolitical concerns loomed largest in its formulation of policy support for alternative energy vehicles.
“Oil security is the biggest driver for NEV development,” he said, adding that Premier Li Keqiang’s “war on pollution”, declared in March this year, was “the second driver”.
Mr Wang is a good salesman and clearly has an interest in highlighting forces that may drive up BYD’s share price, especially given a collapse in sales of its gasoline-fuelled cars this year. But his analysis is worth paying attention to. Chinese auto executives, who are far better connected than their expatriate counterparts at multinational car companies, rarely share their insights on Beijing’s motivations and longer-term objectives in public settings.
BYD’s chairman also has better tuned political antennas than most.
In addition to succeeding as a private entrepreneur in a state-dominated industry – BYD began as a manufacturer of mobile phone batteries before diversifying into cars – Mr Wang also has rather unusual partners.
One of his largest investors is Li Lu, a student leader during the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests. After those ended in bloodshed, Mr Li fled to the US and ended up a billionaire fund manager. The former democracy activist spotted BYD’s potential early and introduced Mr Wang to his idol, Warren Buffett, whose MidAmerican Energy Holdings is now the biggest single shareholder in the company.
Chinese demand for NEVs has been tepid, largely because of drivers’ concerns about the availability of an adequate charging infrastructure. There are only about 70,000 NEVs in use in China, most of them public buses or taxis. That suggests the government’s target of 500,000 NEV sales next year and 5m by 2020 will be difficult to reach.
But Mr Wang said the government was determined to succeed – and not just because it wants a vehicle fleet that can keep running even if maritime lifelines to Middle East oilfields were to be cut off. Beijing, he said, is concerned that while its auto industry may be the world’s largest, it is not the strongest. Foreign brands dominate the market.
According to BYD’s chairman, NEVs offer China’s domestic auto companies an alternative route to industry dominance. He is not alone in this view.
Yesterday, the EU Chamber of Commerce in China expressed concern that government subsidies and incentives for NEVs only apply to those “produced in China under a Chinese brand”. That means underlying technologies have to be disclosed to local authorities.
“While at one level [NEVs] are meant to alleviate China’s dependency on imported oil, on another, [government policy] is a blueprint for the development of an indigenous electric vehicle industry that might one day trump the dominant position of multinational [car companies],” the chamber’s automotive working group said in a position paper.
It argued that Beijing’s strategic vision ignores the fact that “the automotive industry has long been highly globalised . . . in ways that benefit all economic players as well as consumers”.
It would ironic if China’s 21st century quest for energy security was undermined by old-fashioned protectionist instincts.
Tom Mitchell is the Financial Times’ Beijing correspondent
（更多資訊請關注中國進出口網）
